Abstract. The double-random phase encoding (DRPE) scheme, which is based on a 4f optical correlator system, is considered as a reference for the optical encryption field. We propose a modification of the classical DRPE scheme based on the use of a class of structured phase masks, the deterministic phase masks. In particular, we propose to conduct the encryption process by using two deterministic phase masks, which are built from linear combinations of several subkeys. For the decryption step, the input image is retrieved by using the complex conjugate of the deterministic phase masks, which were set in the encryption process. This concept of structured masks gives rise to encryption-decryption keys which are smaller and more compact than those required in the classical DRPE. In addition, we show that our method significantly improves the tolerance of the DRPE method to shifts of the decrypting phase mask-when no shift is applied, it provides similar performance to the DRPE scheme in terms of encryption-decryption results. This enhanced tolerance to the shift, which is proven by providing numerical simulation results for grayscale and binary images, may relax the rigidity of an encryption-decryption experimental implementation setup. To evaluate the effectiveness of the described method, the mean-square-error and the peak signal-to-noise ratio between the input images and the recovered images are calculated. Different studies based on simulated data are also provided to highlight the suitability and robustness of the method when applied to the image encryption-decryption processes.
Introduction
Optical technologies have become increasingly important for securing information, recognition, and have been widely explored to encrypt sensitive information because of their high-speed operation, parallel processing, and multiple dimensional capabilities. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Optical security includes numerous parameters for encryption, including wavelength, phase information, spatial frequency, and polarization of light. Several optical encryption techniques have been suggested with the aim to broaden the research area of information security. [3] [4] [5] [6] Among them, Réfrégier and Javidi 7 proposed a forefather optical encryption method based on a doublerandom phase encoding (DRPE). By using this encryption technique, which may be implemented by means of a Vanderlugt 4f processor, original data embedded in twodimensional amplitude information are transformed into a white stationary noise. This is done by setting two random phase masks in the input and the Fourier planes. Since the publication of this method, the DRPE scheme has been applied in different domains, such as fractional Fourier transform, 9, 10 Fresnel transform, [11] [12] [13] gyrator transform (GT), 14, 15 quaternion Fourier transform, 16 diffractive imaging, 17 dual fractional Fourier-wavelet, 18 fractional Mellin, 19 and Hartley transform. 20 Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that the DRPE scheme is vulnerable to some types of attack [21] [22] [23] and due to its high shift sensitivity, it requires high alignment accuracy in the spatial domain systems. In this regard, several methods have been proposed to improve the shift tolerance of the decrypting phase mask. 24 , 25 Nomura and Javidi 26 proposed an optical double-random phase encryption method using a joint transform correlator (JTC) architecture. Seo and Kim 25 suggested instead a scheme applying a virtual phase image to conceal the original one under a JTC architecture that is robust to shift of the encrypted image. These methods do not produce complex conjugates of the phase key and therefore suffer from autocorrelation terms that appear in the output plane. In addition, in the abovestated methods, the decryption process is performed by optical schemes based on a 4f correlator, which still require an extremely precise alignment. To increase the security, asymmetric cryptosystem has been proposed, for instance, by Rajput and Nishchal 27 to make the decryption keys different from the encryption ones. Other alternatives to the classical DRPE scheme describe the use of structured phase masks in the encryption-decryption process based on Fresnel zone plate (FZP), toroidal zone plate (TZP), or radial Hilbert mask (RHM). Barrera et al. 28, 29 introduced toroidal phase masks as an alternative. Tebaldi et al. 30 presented results on image encryption based on fractal encrypting masks. Abuturab 31 proposed a color information security scheme based on Arnold transform in the GT domain, in which the phase function of FZP is used to generate double-structured phase masks. Vashisth et al. 32 presented an image encryption by employing the phase retrieval algorithm in the fractional Mellin transform domain, in which two structured phase masks are constructed based on TZP and RHM, respectively. Singh et al. 33 proposed the double phaseimage encryption using GTs, in which the structured phase mask is derived from devil's vortex Fresnel lens (DVFL) in the frequency plane. Some recent studies have also introduced structured phase mask based on DVFL. [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] To properly use an encryption method in security applications, the system must be resistant to potential loss of data during the decryption process and more tolerant to alignment accuracy. To fulfill such requirements, in this paper, we propose a modification of the DRPE encryption scheme, based on a category of structured masks that we called deterministic phase masks. Such deterministic masks, based on a linear combination of several subkeys, allow the system to enhance the optical alignment tolerance to shifts of the required phase masks when compared to the classical DRPE method. Another advantage of our method is the compact and tiny size of the encoding-decoding keys, facilitating the keys exchange process. In addition, there is no need to send the mask itself for reconstruction, but only a small set of numerical parameters. This situation may substantially prevent the loss of information of the keys.
The outline of this paper is as follows: first, the principle of the encryption-decryption algorithm and the masks' generation are described in Sec. 2. Section 3 presents several simulated results as a proof of concept of the proposed method. In particular, the encryption-decryption of two different images is analyzed: (i) a black and white text image and (ii) a 256 grayscale image. To evaluate the quality of the recovered images, the mean-square-error (MSE) and the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) between the input images and the recovered images are calculated. Next, the robustness of the deterministic phase masks-based method is studied in Sec. 4. Three different situations are analyzed: robustness to shifts of the phase masks in the Fourier plane (Sec. 4.1), robustness to loss of encrypted data (Sec. 4.2), and robustness to deterministic keys attacks (Sec. 4.3). Finally, the main conclusions of the work are provided in Sec. 5.
Principle of the Encryption-Decryption Method
In this section, we first review the DRPE optical setup, which is used to conduct the deterministic keys approach that we propose (Sec. 2.1). Afterward, in Sec. 2.2, we provide the theoretical background for the generation of deterministic masks.
Encryption and Decryption Schemes
The scheme for image encryption and decryption we propose in this work requires the use of the deterministic-based masks. For their proper implementation, we use a modification of the well-known DRPE optical setup, which is based on a Vanderlugt 4f system. The schemes for the encryption and decryption processes are shown in Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) , respectively, where L1 and L2 are two convergent lenses of focal length f and DK1 and DK2 are the generated deterministic phase masks.
During the encryption stage, the input image to be encrypted fðx; yÞ is first multiplied by a deterministic phase mask (DK1) in the input plane. The resulting complex image is Fourier transformed and then multiplied by a second deterministic phase mask (DK2) in the frequency plane. The encrypted image is then obtained by performing inverse Fourier transform (IFT). Note that in an optical scheme as in Fig. 1 , the operation to be performed is not the IFT but the direct FT. In the simulated case, the complex output encrypted image cðx; yÞ can be written as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 1 ; 3 2 6 ; 1 1 7 cðx; yÞ ¼ IFTfFTffðx; yÞ · DK1ðx; yÞg · DK2ðu; vÞg; (1) where FTf:g and IFTf:g represent the Fourier transform and inverse Fourier transform, respectively. The decryption process is the reverse of the encryption process, where the encrypted image is Fourier transformed and then multiplied by the complex conjugate of the mask (DK2). An IFT is then performed, followed by multiplication by the complex conjugate of the first mask (DK1). The decrypted image f 0 ðx; yÞ can be expressed as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 2 ; 6 3 ; 3 9 7 f 0 ðx; yÞ ¼ IFTfFTfcðx; yÞg · DK2 Ã ðu; vÞg · DK1 Ã ðx; yÞ;
where * indicates the conjugate of the deterministic phase mask. Note that in the case of registering the intensity of the decrypted image, multiplication by DK1* is not needed.
As an example, an optical architecture has been depicted with the aim to implement the encryption-decryption scheme as shown in Fig. 1 . The setup of such architecture is presented in Fig. 2 .
The setup sketched in Fig. 2 consists of two optical arms. In ARM1 (green dashed line) the encrypted image is obtained, while in ARM2 the decryption process is performed. In ARM1, the 4f correlator in Fig. 1(a) is introduced in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer (phase-shifting interferometric correlator 39 ) to obtain the amplitude and phase of the encrypted image. The keys DK1 and DK2 are introduced on SLM1 and SLM2, respectively. In ARM2 (orange dotted line), the 4f correlator of Fig. 1(b) is implemented. The encrypted image is introduced in the SLM3 and the propagated beam is Fourier transformed by means of the convergent lens L 5 . At the Fourier plane, the key DK2* is introduced on the SLM4, and finally, the decrypted image is recorded by the CCD2. In ARM1, a single interference can be recorded. In this case, a tilted reference should be used to separate the different diffracted orders. The same tilted reference has to be used in ARM2.
Deterministic Mask Generation
The first step in the deterministic mask (DK) construction procedure consists of defining an order of encryption ðmÞ to specify the number of subkeys (NS) into the mask, where NS ¼ ð2 m × 2 m Þ. By setting the value of m (m is an integer number), we split the input image in NS equal subblocks of size d ¼ dim∕2 m , where dim is the size of the input image. Then we generate a linear phase with random orientation and frequency for each available subkey.
For simplicity, we show an example for the case m ¼ 2. Thus, we consider a deterministic mask (DK) with size ð256 × 256Þ divided into 16 subkeys of size ð64 × 64Þ, where d ¼ dim∕2 2 . The resulting DK can be written as a linear combination of the stated 16 submasks M ij , as shown by the following equation:
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 3 ; 3 2 6 ; 4 1 1
More precisely, to set each particular subkey to an appropriate spatial position, we construct the complete DK image in the spatial domain by using the following equation (for m ¼ 2):
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 4 ; 3 2 6 ; 3 2 0 DK 1 ðx; yÞ
where x and y are defined into the interval ½1; dim and rect is the rectangle function described as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 5 ; 3 2 6 ; 2 1 4 rectðx; yÞ ¼ & 1; for jxj < 
and M ij is defined as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 6 ; 3 2 6 ; 1 5 7 M ij ðx; yÞ ¼ exp½i2πðu k :x þ v k :yÞ ¼ exp½iφ ij ðx; yÞ; k ¼ 1; : : : ; NS;
where u k and v k are randomly generated in the interval ½1; d. To illustrate the above described procedure, an example of a deterministic mask generated for m ¼ 2 is illustrated in Fig. 3 . . In this way, we obtain the interferences of the encrypted image with a reference wave on CCD1 camera where the interferences are digitalized. ARM2 the encrypted image is displayed in the SLM3 and its FT is obtained at the SLM4 plane. Finally, the decrypted image is formed at the CCD2 camera. M, mirror; BS, beam splitter; L, lenses; PH, pinhole; SLM, spatial light modulator; CCD, CCD camera; and PZT, piezoelectric transductor. In addition, the same scheme shown above for m ¼ 2 can be generalized for an arbitrary m value, and in such a case, the deterministic mask is expressed as follows:
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 7 ; 6 3 ; 5 6 6 DK ¼
and is completely determined just by choosing the following set of parameters: fdim; m; As shown in Fig. 2 , for the experimental implementation of the proposed technique, a spatial light modulator (SLM) can be used to generate the deterministic masks proposed. In such a case, the largest NS to be implemented is limited by the number of pixels of the modulator. Note that for a fixed size of the SLM, the larger the number m set to implement the subkeys, the lower the number of pixels used to implement such a subkey. By increasing the order m, we can arrive at a minimum submask size of 1 × 1 pixels. In this particular case, the idea of a linear phase is lost and the classical DRPE method is obtained. Thus, the deterministic keybased approach can be understood as a generalization of the classical DRPE method.
Proof of Concept of the Method: Numerical
Simulations for the Encryption-Decryption Process In this section, we study the feasibility, effectiveness, and sensitivity of the proposed method based on simulated results. In this work, the influence of some experimental parameters on the imaging process has not been considered, such as SLM dimensions, bandwidth, and so on. In addition, to prove the validity of the proposed approach, we performed the image decryption of the encrypted images as shown in Figs. 5(e) and 5(f) by using the correct keys [i.e., by using the masks obtained by conducting the complex conjugated of the deterministic masks DK1 and DK2 shown in Figs 
E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 0 9 ; 6 3 ; 5 5 7 PSNR ¼ 10 × log 10 255
where fðx; yÞ and f 0 ðx; yÞ denote the original image and the decrypted image, respectively. In turn, N × M is the number of pixels of the original image. It may be noted that a smaller value of MSE means greater similarity between the original and recovered image. In turn, the greater the PSNR value, the better the quality of the retrieved image. The MSE between the retrieved image [ Fig. 6(a) ] and the original grayscale image [ Fig. 5(a) Note that the MSE and PSNR values obtained for the decrypted images when using our proposed deterministic key generation are quite similar to those obtained by using the DRPE scheme. Thus, our proposed technique appears to be a good alternative to the DRPE method in terms of decrypted image quality.
The performance of the proposed scheme is also calculated in terms of the relative error (RE) between the original and the decrypted images. The RE between the original and decrypted images is defined as E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; e 0 1 0 ; 3 2 6 ; 7 5 
Deterministic Mask-Based Method Robustness
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the proposed method by applying it to three different situations that can arise in experimental implementations: (i) robustness to spatial shifts of the decrypting deterministic phase masks (Sec. 4.1), (ii) robustness to certain loss of encrypted data (Sec. 4.2), and (iii) robustness to external attacks (use of unauthorized deterministic keys, Sec. 4.3).
Robustness to Spatial Shifts of the Decrypting Phase Mask in the Fourier Plane
In this subsection, we examine the robustness of the proposed method to the shift tolerance in comparison with the well-established DRPE method. Figure 7 shows the decrypted images obtained with the DRPE decryption method when the second phase mask in the Fourier plane (i.e., random phases mask set as encryption key 2, used in the decryption step) is shifted in x-and y-directions in steps of one [ Fig. 7 As can be seen, a slight shift of the key in the DRPE system results in large errors during the decryption process, and the image cannot be recovered in any case. Figure 8 shows the same analysis discussed above but conducted with the proposed method. In particular, we show the decrypted images obtained when the decrypting deterministic phase mask is shifted in the Fourier plane (i.e., the mask DK2*; see Fig. 1 for decryption step) by one [ Fig. 8(a) ], two [ Fig. 8(b) ], and three [ Fig. 8(c) ] pixels , and 8(f), respectively. Even when the decrypted key mask is shifted from the matching position along the x − y axis, the decrypted images (Fig. 8 ) are still visually recognizable, being much better reconstructed than those obtained with the DRPE method (presented in Fig. 7 ). In fact, the MSEs obtained between the original and the decrypted images were: 0.0198 (for one pixel shift), 0.0246 (two), and 0.0328 (three) for the Lena image; and 0.0125 (for one pixel shift), 0.0237 (two), and 0.0285 (three) for the binary text image. These small MSE values indicate that, unlike the DRPE method (Fig. 7) , our proposed technique allows some original information to be retrieved (Fig. 8) . The simulated results shown in Fig. 7 prove that the DRPE method is very sensitive to shifts of the mask in the decryption process. Under such a scenario, very small misalignments of the decrypting phase mask (1 pixel) prevent the DRPE method from image decryption. On the contrary, the proposed deterministic-based method enhances the shift tolerance of the system (see Fig. 8 ) when compared to the DRPE performance, thus, the proposed encryption algorithm can be considered as an efficient alternative to the DRPE method.
Robustness to the Loss of the Encrypted Data
We have also studied the robustness to the loss of the encrypted data under network failure during the image transmission. To simulate losses of the encrypted information before decryption, some parts of the encrypted images were blocked by means of square black filters with different sizes (from 1 × 1 to 128 × 128 pixels), which were placed in random positions. Then, the MSE coefficient corresponding to the decrypted images was calculated. As an example, Fig. 9 shows the data loss in the encrypted images for the Lena image [ Figs In all the cases shown in Fig. 9 , we generated the phase masks by setting m ¼ 3 (therefore, 64 subkey masks were implemented). As stated above, in each case, the generated filter was centered on arbitrary position of the encrypted image. The corresponding recovered images are presented in Figs. 10(a)-10(d) for the Lena image and in Figs. 10(e)-10(h) for the binary text image, respectively. In addition, the corresponding MSE values between the original images and the decrypted ones are included as insets in the figures. It is evident that the larger the information loss in the encrypted image, the larger the MSE value obtained. However, a rough version of the original image can be retrieved and recognized in all the cases. The quality of these decrypted images can be improved by image processing operations. From the abovestated simulations, we confirm that the proposed algorithm is robust to data encryption losses.
Finally, in addition to the visual analysis presented in Fig. 10 , a more quantitative analysis is presented below. We have calculated the MSE for the original-decrypted images (for the Lena case) when the decrypted image was obtained with a different amount of loss of information in the encrypted images. The information loss was performed by selecting a random position of the blocker, which presented a random size (into a size range between 1 × 1 to 128 × 128 pixels). MSE results obtained after performing 1000 runs are shown in Fig. 11 . In addition, the above-stated simulations were repeated for different values of the encryption order m: m ¼ 2 [ Fig. 11(a) ], m ¼ 3 [ Fig. 11(b) ], and m ¼ 4 [ Fig. 11(c) ]. In all the cases, we observe how larger blocker sizes correspond to bigger MSE. In addition, the larger the parameter m we set, the lower the MSE fluctuation observed. Note that for the simulated results performed, even in the case of the largest information losses (i.e., information blocker with 128 × 128 pixels), the MSE values are always smaller than 0.1, which demonstrates robustness to the loss of encrypted data.
Robustness to External Attacks: Decryption Based on Unauthorized Deterministic Keys
Because the calculation of a deterministic mask (DK) is analytically performed, instead of sending the mask itself, we can send a set of numerical parameters (the key) to reproduce it: {dim, m, and By using these deterministic keys DKY1 and DKY2, we obtained the corresponding encrypted images, which were illustrated in Figs. 5(e) and 5(f), respectively, and decrypted images illustrated in Figs. 6(a) and 6(b), respectively.
By contrast, Fig. 12 shows the decrypted images, for the Lena image [ Fig. 12(a) ] and the binary text image [ Fig. 12(b) ], which were obtained by using a false key DKY2 in the decryption process, let us call it as DKY2b: As shown in Fig. 12 , the use in the decryption process of a deterministic key (DKY2b), different from the original one (DKY2), does not allow us to retrieve any information of the original image. In turn, decrypted images shown in Fig. 13 for the Lena image [ Fig. 13(a) ] and the binary text image [ Fig. 13(b) ] were obtained by performing a slight modification of the original deterministic key DKY2. In particular, the modified deterministic key was achieved by only changing one of the 16 subkeys of DKY2, i.e., the value w ðk¼10Þ ¼ 2163 in DKY2 was changed to 122. This situation led to the deterministic key DKY2c: E Q -T A R G E T ; t e m p : i n t r a l i n k -; s e c 4 . From the previous simulated results, we observed that for the m ¼ 2 case, a satisfactory decryption process was not possible when using incorrect deterministic keys (Figs. 12 and 13), even when only one of the decryption subkeys was changed (Fig. 13) . Thus, the use of the very exact pair of deterministic keys is mandatory to properly decrypt the original image with our proposed technique. This situation highlights the robustness of the method to external attacks.
Conclusion
In the present paper, we propose an encryption-decryption method to overcome the extremely difficult axis alignment requirements of the DRPE method, which arises from the use of a 4f correlator in the decryption stage. Our technique uses a pair of deterministic phase masks defined by an order of encryption parameter m and a linear combination of several subkeys. The numerical results provided in this work demonstrate that the proposed deterministic mask-based encryption-decryption technique has several interesting features in comparison to the DRPE. First, the system provides similar results to the classical DRPE method, in terms of image retrieving for an ideally aligned system. However, our method is much less affected by spatial shifts of the phase mask in the Fourier plane than the DRPE, allowing for less precise alignment requirements during decryption processes. Second, we have demonstrated that our method is able to reconstruct the original image under distortions caused by the occlusion of specific parts of the encrypted images, which may be important in case of a network failure during image transmission. Last but not least, the phase masks generation relays on a simple set of numerical parameters, therefore, the reconstruction of the image does not necessary imply the sending of the totality of the mask, but only of the proper set of parameters (the key). This situation largely reduces the chances of loss of information during the transmission stage. The proposed method can be then presented as a promising alternative to standard methods and may find an excellent application in securing data.
